Winners and Losers? Citizens and Sceptics? European Integration and the Spread of Cosmopolitanism by Favell, Adrian & Reimer, David
  
Policy Brief 
Winners and Losers? Citizens and Sceptics? 
European Integration and the Spread of Cosmopolitanism 
Adrian Favell and David Reimer 
 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
European integration: an 
elite project? 
 
 
 
 
Euroscepticism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It has become a commonplace in discussion on Europe to argue that European 
integration most benefits elites and upper classes -- people most likely to have 
international connections – while being of much less benefit to lower classes. This 
fact in turn is then linked to the widespread mistrust and (sometimes) hostility 
among ordinary citizens to the European project. 
 
Related to this, and which also threatens the integrity of the EU, is growing 
Euroscepticism in countries which are politically and economically important to the 
European project's success: notably the UK and Denmark, who have positioned 
themselves as outsiders to the core of much of the EU. 
 
The 7th Framework Program EUCROSS research project provides new data to re-
examine these issues and offer suggestions to how European policy makers might 
make a more constructive case for the positive effects of European integration, 
including in more Eurosceptic countries. 
 
 SUPPORT FOR THE EU VERSUS EVERYDAY TRANSNATIONALISM 
The image of the EU and 
the economic crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Europe for winners? 
 
 
 
 
 
Without a doubt, general support for the EU has suffered considerably as a result 
of the recent economic crisis in Europe and a perception of the EU going in the 
wrong direction.  
 
When asked in Eurobarometer 2012 (Figure 1), it was found that EU citizens 
continue to support, or are at least neutral for the idea of the EU, but are much 
less happy about the "present direction of the EU". Clearly, EU citizens across the 
continent feel that the EU is not working as it should.  
 
The results are as bad, if not worse, for countries with historically high support for 
or identification with the EU (such as Germany and Italy), as they are for more 
Eurosceptic countries like the UK or Denmark. 
 
American sociologist Neil Fligstein's widely read Euroclash (2008), which is based 
on secondary analysis of sources such as Eurobarometer, propagated the view that 
the growing legitimacy deficit indexed by these findings is linked to the fact that 
European integration only clearly benefits the winners in European society. Middle 
classes, meanwhile, are positioned ambiguously: they appreciate the EU on some 
issues, not on others. As times get tough, their consent is likely to waver. Support 
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Or a substantial 
"horizontal 
Europeanisation"? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for European integration certainly seems to line up with higher class or education, 
when it is broken down as Fligstein does. And, on the basis of existing surveys, 
there is evidence that in terms of social and professional networks, international 
experiences, education abroad and so on, elite and upper middle classes seem to 
make more use of what we might call "transnational opportunities" provided by 
the EU. 
 
Figure 1: Reactions to the European Union (%) 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 77.3, May 2012  
 
An alternative view, though, is provided by German sociologists Steffen Mau and 
Roland Verwiebe. Based on a survey of the German population, in European 
Societies: Mapping Structure and Change (2010) they argue for the quite profound 
everyday transformation of the mass of European societies connected to European 
integration. When these effects are traced over time, not only can it be seen that 
there has been a substantial "horizontal Europeanisation"; it also suggests, in many 
ways, that the people whose lives have changed the most as a result of more 
international opportunities created by the EU are ordinary and average citizens 
rather than elites (who perhaps would have these opportunities regardless of 
whether Europe had open borders). 
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12 questions for an index 
of transnational 
practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Europeanised practices 
and internationalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So which of these views is right? And how do they relate to the variation in the 
support levels across Europe, particularly in countries which may damage 
European integration by exiting? 
 
The EUCROSS project (as in Steffen Mau and associates' work) focuses on 
"transnational practices" in the European Union. We argue that concrete 
behaviour is a more reliable guide to what matters in society than expressions of 
identity, and the inevitable fluctuations of political support.  
 
To analyse our results, we have constructed an index of transnational practices, 
composed from a set of 12 questions asked to our respondents. Transnational 
practices, of course, may not be restricted to a European scale: certain kinds of 
cross-border transaction or tie may rather be linked to growing global 
interconnections and integration. Thought of this way, it is striking how 
transnational European populations have become, and also how much more they 
are transnational in countries that are often seen at the edge of Europe. 
 
For example, the following three questions (table 1) give an indication of how 
internationalised European residents have become. We asked respondents about 
whether they had live abroad, their familiarity with other countries, and whether 
they knew anybody living in another country. 
 
Table 1: Internationalisation of European residents (% yes-answers) 
 Denmark Germany Italy Romania Spain UK N 
Lived abroad for 
more than three 
months (since 
turning 18)? 
23.3 15.4 11.8 17.9 13.7 24.3 6013 
Familiarity with one 
or more foreign 
countries? 
59.6 66.2 41.6 48.0 48.6 63.7 6004 
Know anyone else 
living in another 
country? 
49.1 48.8 57.8 78.7 65.7 64.5 6005 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
 
Note these questions are not restricted to Europeanised practices, but rather 
indicate general levels of internationalisation. And what we find is a quite strong 
degree of internationalisation, across the board. Markedly in Germany (which we 
would expect), but also especially Denmark and the UK, there is a higher 
experience of living abroad, familiarity with foreign countries, or knowing people in 
other countries.  
 
If we look at transnational practices linked more obviously to European integration 
the pattern does not change so much (table 2). But it is more pronounced as 
regards general free movement and open market opportunities than much 
trumpeted official EU policies, such as educational exchanges.  
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Willingness to move is 
not limited to southern 
Europeans 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Europeanised practices (% yes-answers) 
 Denmark Germany Italy Romania Spain UK N 
Participated in EU 
sponsored exchange 
program? 
3.7  3.9  4.5  8.1  6.8 2.9 5979 
Bought goods in 
other EU MS in last 
24 months? 
40.5 27.2 17.4 13.0 19.7 32.1 5986 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
 
Only a tiny minority of respondents – also due to generational constraints – appear 
to have benefitted from this kind of formal transnational opportunity, with slightly 
more from the south and east of Europe. However, if we look at questions about 
more general transnational practices, only this time linked more obviously to 
European integration, the results are more marked. Danes, Germans and British 
are much more likely to have shopped abroad. They are also more likely to have 
engaged in short term business and pleasure trips abroad (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Number of overnight trips abroad in the last 24 months (average by 
country) 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
 
As figure 3 shows, on a question related to the central issue of freedom of 
movement of work, southern Europeans as might be expected are highly willing to 
move abroad for work, but close to half of Germans, British and Danes (a little less) 
are also ready to "get on their bike". 
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Transnational practices 
and European 
identification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Willingness to move abroad (% yes-answers) 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
 
These various indicators illustrate concrete effects of European integration that 
may in fact suggest a strong Europeanisation of, for example, Danish and British 
society, even if these countries express negative opinions about the EU or are 
unlikely to identify with it. 
When we put 12 such questions together as an index of transnational practices, it 
is striking which of the countries studied is the most internationalised (figure 4). 
This is the rank order, first asking only 6 questions about cross-border migration 
and (physical) mobilities (in blue), then including other items to do with cross-
border friendship networks, shopping and knowledge (in red). 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Index 1- Mobilities is a simple additive index consisting of six binary variables: (1) Familiarity with one or more countries 
(yes), (2) Lived in another country before turning 18 (yes), (3) Visited at least 3 countries before turning 18 (yes), (4) Lived in 
another country for at least 3 month after turning 18 (yes), (5), Participated in EU sponsored exchange program, (6) 3 or 
more overnight trips abroad in last 24 months. For Index 2 – Combined, six additional binary variables were added to the six 
mobility items: (1) Know anybody living in another country (yes), (2) Command of at least one foreign language (yes), (9) At 
least 10% of all received messages from abroad (email/phone etc.) (yes), (10) Ever sent money abroad for reasons other 
than purchasing goods/services (yes), (11) Purchased goods abroad (yes), (12) Watch foreign TV once a month or more 
(yes). In order to make the two indices comparable, each index was divided by the number of items (6 for index 1, 12 for 
index 2). A respondent who answered yes on 3 out of the 6 questions for the first index would thus receive a score of 0.5. 
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Distinguishing the 
political and the 
sociological bases of 
European integration 
 
Figure 4: Indices of transnationalism (mobility and other practices) 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012 
 
What these results display is that on a scale of 0-1 Danes score 0.36 on physical 
mobilities, which rises to 0.41 including other cross-border connections. This is 
nearly twice the transnational index of Italians and Spanish, whereas Germans and 
British are in-between.   
 
There is a strong indication here, then, that everyday Europeanised practices in 
countries such as Denmark and the UK far outstrip the conscious identification 
with or support for the European project. This suggests both a certain illusion of 
independence among these countries, but also that they have a lot to lose from 
leaving the project. The politics of European integration in these countries is not 
the same as the sociology of European integration. 
 
On the other hand, the support for the EU expressed in Spain and Italy is not 
connected with higher levels of transnationalism. Perhaps promoting the EU in 
terms of seeking European identity is not the political secret to heighten conscious 
support. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION 
Higher education entails 
higher transnationalism 
 
 
 
 
But the education gap is 
smaller in Denmark and 
Germany 
 
 
What, though, can EUCROSS say about the effect of social stratification on 
transnational practices? At this stage, we analysed the transnationalism index in 
relation to educational levels, which is often taken as a proxy for social class. For 
the entire sample (all countries), there is a pronounced relationship between 
higher levels of education and more transnationalism.  
 
But when we break out the differences between countries (Table 3), there seems 
to be quite some variation. While the relationship holds, the gulf in 
transnationalism between the highly educated and people with secondary 
schooling is smaller in Denmark and Germany than elsewhere.  
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The difficulties of 
measuring the effect of 
transnationalism on EU 
support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Transnationalism and education by country 
Country by education Low Transnationalism High Transnationalism 
Denmark   
Compulsory Schooling 81.0 19.0 
Secondary Schooling 65.6 34.4 
Tertiary Schooling 42.3 57.7 
Germany   
Compulsory Schooling 96.5  3.5 
Secondary Schooling 78.0 22.0 
Tertiary Schooling 56.6 43.4 
Italy   
Compulsory Schooling 98.4  1.6 
Secondary Schooling 92.0  8.0 
Tertiary Schooling 72.2 27.8 
Romania    
Compulsory Schooling 95.6  4.4 
Secondary Schooling 93.0  7.0 
Tertiary Schooling 74.7 25.3 
Spain   
Compulsory Schooling 99.4  0.6 
Secondary Schooling 92.0  8.0 
Tertiary Schooling 73.6 26.4 
United Kingdom   
Compulsory Schooling 95.8  4.2 
Secondary Schooling 88.6 11.4 
Tertiary Schooling 65.4 34.6 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012. Note: Low transnationalism corresponds to 0.0-0.50 ; high 
transnationalism to 0.51-1.0 on the transnationalism index (see footnote 1 for further explanation).  
 
Contrary to Fligstein, then, we find a persistent but less marked social class divide, 
and the suggestion that middle classes are becoming more transnational in 
Germany and Denmark.  
 
So what have been the effects of the routine, everyday transnationalism facilitated 
by European integration? At first sight, not growing European identification or 
support (see Hanquinet and Savage 2013). But asking people who have benefitted 
from the EU if they support the EU is perhaps not the right question, particularly 
given the politically contentious image of the EU in some countries and the way it 
gets identified with negativity about politics, politicians and bureaucrats more 
generally. Other researchers, such as Sophie Duchesne and associates (2013), have 
shown very clearly that ‘European integration’, at face value, has little sense or 
meaning to ordinary citizens. 
 
 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND COSMOPOLITANISM 
Europeanisation and 
cosmopolitan values 
 
 
We follow Steffen Mau in thinking that the more general internationalisation 
facilitated by European integration is an important side-effect of the process. That 
is, what might be important as a consequence of European integration is not 
conscious support for the EU (when asked), but the way it has encouraged a more 
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Dimensions of 
cosmopolitanism: 
tolerance for diversity, 
responsibilities for the 
fate of other countries 
and acceptance of supra-
national governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
widespread embrace of cosmopolitan values.  
 
Cosmopolitanism can be conceived in a number of ways. In our definition (and 
Mau's) we see it in terms of three important dimensions: 
 
 the spread of tolerance for cultural/ethnic/religious diversity, i.e., the 
recognition of other cultures 
 the willingness to accept some responsibility for the fate of foreign 
countries/populations 
 the acceptance of international institutions as better ways to manage 
certain large scale (global or macro-regional) issues. 
 
EUCROSS was able investigate in detail these three dimensions. The results reveal 
not only high and enthusiastic levels of cosmopolitanism among all citizens of the 
EU, but further particularities about the relationship of people in Denmark and the 
UK – the two most Eurosceptic populations – to Europeanisation and globalisation.  
 
Figure 5: Dimensions of cosmopolitanism: tolerance for diversity, supra-national 
responsibility and supra-national governance 
 
 
Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012. Note: Diversity is measured by the following item: “it is a good thing 
for society to be made up of people from different ethnic groups” (‘strongly’ and ‘quite’ agree, in %). 
Supra-national responsibility by the following item: “The whole EU should make financial 
contributions to reconstruct a member state struck by a natural disaster” (yes, in %). Supra-national 
governance by the following item: it is a good thing that “EU member states are currently pooling 
national state funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts” (‘strongly’ and 
‘quite’ agree, in %). 
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National differences in 
cosmopolitanism 
 
 
 
 
A common and 
widespread sense of 
responsibility towards 
other Europeans… 
 
 
 
… provided the EU is left 
aside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On toleration and recognition of other cultures, British respondents score high, 
and Danish low relative to all others (figure 5). Interestingly, though, less than 50% 
of Danes, British and Germans would describe themselves as "citizens of the 
world", while the majority of southern and eastern Europeans in our sample do 
(that is, 79.9% of the Spanish, 69.8% of Romanians and 64.4% of Italians). 
 
Yet things level out when respondents are asked about the sense of collective 
responsibility and risk-sharing with fellow Europeans – the second of the three 
dimensions of cosmopolitanism. On this, even 78.6% of the British sample state 
that they would husband common financial efforts to help out ‘financially’ other 
EU populations in trouble. Proportions are over 80% in all other countries, and 
over 90% in Italy, Spain and Romania. 
 
However, though, when the EU as an institution is explicitly mixed into the 
questions about cosmopolitanism, for example suggesting the EU is the 
appropriate place to bail out member states, then the cosmopolitan enthusiasm of 
the British, the Danes but also the Germans begins to melt away. On whether the 
EU should have as an appropriate goal “the promotion of solidarity between the 
peoples of the EU”, the British only record 64% against an average of 81%. Only 
43% of British respondents in our sample would be sorry if the EU disappeared 
entirely. Unsurprisingly, in fact, southern Europeans are very enthusiastic for 
solidarity in the EU in all its forms. 
 
Generally, there seems to be a positive association between transnationalism and 
cosmopolitan values all over the place, including Denmark and the UK. This has 
clearly been facilitated by the EU. This association weakens, however, when the EU 
is specifically invoked.  
 
 POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 
Cross-border practices 
foster cosmopolitanism 
but not necessarily EU 
legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
Stress the everyday life 
benefits of EU citizenship 
and single market 
policies 
 
 
 
 
A recent assessment of European citizenship concludes that ‘connections beyond 
and across national boundaries can generate experience worth having and 
enriched life-options’ (Kostakopoulou 2013: 44). Our research findings suggest that 
there is more to it: cross-border practices under the EU citizenship regime have 
helped the spread of cosmopolitan values, including to countries that claim to be 
sceptical or outside the European project. The policy conclusions we would draw 
relate more to recognising these outcomes of European integration among 
ordinary citizens, rather than in changing policies.  
 
 It would be better for policy makers to focus on the EU’s promotion of 
wider, global and multicultural values, than on European identity per se. 
 
 Everyday experiences of mobility and international connections clearly 
have had good effects across the population (not just elites), and the 
Europeanisation of everyday life in these terms needs to be better known. 
 
 Policy makers should be prepared to defend open single market policies 
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Avoid the 
Europeanisation-closure 
association 
 
 
Beware of too abstract 
measurements of EU 
support 
 
 
 
 
 
that have enabled the free movement of goods, services and persons. 
These market related benefits appeal more to EU citizens that are less 
keen on the overt political goals of the continent. 
 
 However, much of the Europeanisation of Europe is intimately linked to, 
and embedded in, wider global processes. The two are not in opposition. 
Policy makers should avoid suggestions that promote the idea of closure or 
protection of a distinctive European mode of society and economy. 
 
 Policy makers should rely less on the crude approach of Eurobarometer 
style surveys, and take notice of the more sophisticated indicators being 
offered by the current sociology of the European Union. They should in 
particular be aware that direct questions about European identity or 
support for the European project, may either confuse respondents or elicit 
their hostility. 
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 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 The EUCROSS research project examines the relationship between the manifold 
activities of EU residents (nationals, mobile EU citizens, and third-country 
nationals) across the borders of nation states and their collective identities. To 
disentangle empirically the factors and mechanisms that link together the cross-
border practices facilitated by European integration, globalisation and/or other 
dimensions of collective identity, EUCROSS adopts a two-stage, mixed 
quantitative/qualitative approach.  
In the first stage, a quantitative survey (8,500 cases) is carried out among 
nationals, intra-EU movers (Romanian citizens) and third-country nationals (Turkish 
citizens) who reside in six European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, 
Spain and the United Kingdom). In the second stage, via 160 in-depth interviews, 
the meaning given by individuals to cross-border practices, their collective 
identifications, and the role that the European Union, globalisation, and the nation 
play in these personal narratives is investigated among a select typology of 
respondents to the quantitative survey. 
 
 
 EUCROSS Policy Brief 
 
 
11 
 
 
 EUCROSS CONSORTIUM 
 
   (Coordinator) Università degli studi ‘Gabriele d’Annunzio’ di Chieti-
Pescara 
http://www.unich.it  
 
  GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften 
 http://www.gesis.org 
 
  Aarhus University, Center for Global and Regional Studies (GLOREA) 
http://projects.au.dk/glorea/  
 
  Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) 
http://www.ibei.org 
 
  University of York 
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/soci/ 
 
  University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work 
http://www.unibuc.ro/en/fac_fsas_en 
 
 
